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ABSTRACT

Startling numbers of people die every day because they do not have access to
essential medicines and treatment for diseases such as HIV/AIDS, particularly in
Africa and Asia. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) was established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to set a
minimum level of protection of intellectual property rights across international
borders, as well as promote and protect the welfare of humanity. This Comment
reviews the history of the TRIPS Agreement, including the most recent adoption of
the WTO relating to the issuance of compulsory licenses. Specifically, this Comment
suggests that the WTO look to United States case law on the topic of governmental
use of patents without authorization, in addition to the spirit and goals of the TRIPS
Agreement, and amend TRIPS by setting adequate remuneration at a very modest
royalty rate when a compulsory license is utilized. Implementation of such an
amendment will prevent further delay to the access to critical medicines in
developing countries and advance the objectives of TRIPS.
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INTRODUCTION
Infectious and parasitic diseases killed over ten million people worldwide in
2001, with over five million deaths resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria.' In 2002, HIV/AIDS alone caused the life expectancy to drop in fifty-one
countries, with some disturbing discrepancies in sub-Saharan Africa.2
One of the main reasons for these alarming statistics is that the access to
adequate health care to prevent and treat these diseases is almost non-existent in
developing countries.3
These problems arise mostly due to the high prices of
pharmaceutical products produced by Western companies.4 In order to support
research and development for further products, pharmaceutical companies maintain
that prices must remain high while they have enforceable rights to their patents.5
While these companies are making money off the high prices of their products, people
* Juris Doctor Candidate, June 2005, The John Marshall Law School; Bachelor of Arts Biology, University of Kansas, 2000. I would like to thank my parents for their love and support,
Whitney for putting up with me, Katie for listening to me, and the RIPL editorial staff for all their
help.
hWorld Health Organization, The World Health Report 2002,Annex Table 2 (WHO 2002).
2 U.S. Agency for International Development, Life Expectancy Will Drop Worldwide Due to
AIDS, at http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2002/pro2o7o8.html (Oct. 2, 2002) (noting that in
Botswana the average life expectancy is 39 years, whereas without the AIDS caused deaths it would
have
been
72).
See
also AIDS to Decimate Life Expectancy, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/03/O6/southafricalife.ap
(last visited Oct. 2,
2002)
(predicting that in the next six years the life expectancy of blacks in South Africa will drop by fifteen
years; also noting the projected low life expectancies in other sub-Saharan countries in ten years,
such as Malawi and Mozambique (below thirty years), Swaziland (forty years), Lesotho (thirty-three
years), and Zambia (thirty-four years)); AIDS to Cut Life Span to 27 Years, available at
http://new.hst.org.za/news/index.php/20010615/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2004) (predicting that in ten
years in Zimbabwe, life expectancy will plummet seventeen years).
3 Ellen 'tHoen, PUBLIC HEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
Patents, and Access to EssentialMedicines:a Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI.J. INT'L L. 27,
28 (2002) (commenting that one third, one half in the case of Africa and Asia, of the world does not
have access to essential drugs because they are unaffordable or are not adapted to local conditions).
4 Jean 0. Lanjouw, A Now GlobalPatent Regime for Diseases: US. and InternationalLegal
Issues, 16 HARv.J. LAW & TEC. 85, 90 (2002) (showing through tables that over forty-five percent of
the world population accounts only four percent of all drug sales).
5 See David B. Resnik & Kenneth A. De Ville, Bioterrorism and Patent Rights: "Compulsory
Licensuro" and the Case of C/pro, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer, 2002, at 29 (discussing that it can
cost hundreds of millions of dollars to bring a drug from conception to the market with only
approximately a ten year window of enforceable rights on the patent). See generally U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securingfor limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. (emphasis added).
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in poor countries are dying at alarming rates because they cannot afford a simple
vaccine for malaria, or the $15,000 a year needed to stay alive with HlIV/AIDS. 6
Pressure from the international community to help developing countries combat
disease and increase access to essential medical treatment has forced action by world
governments. Starting with the formation of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
in 1994, the international community recognized the importance of intellectual
property protection and adopted the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS Agreement")] However, ambiguities in the TRIPS
Agreement led to the Doha Declaration in November 2001, which declared that these
ambiguities must be resolved immediately.8
After almost two years of waiting and political positioning, WTO member
countries finally came to an agreement on how to implement the Doha Declaration. 9
This agreement recognizes that compulsory licensing is necessary to serve the public
health in developing countries.
A compulsory license with respect to a patent is
defined as granting the use of a patent to a third party without the authorization of
the patent holder."
Section I of this Comment will discuss the history and events leading up to the
agreement adopted on August 30, 2003 ("Implementation Agreement"), specifically
how countries interpreted and implemented TRIPS articles without a formal
interpretation. Section II will briefly analyze the new agreement to see what it did
and did not accomplish and will discuss issues that may arise. It will also look at the
issue of "adequate remuneration" from the perspectives of the world's developed and
least developed countries. Additionally, possible interpretations of this ambiguous
phrase will be analyzed through a review of U.S. court decisions. Finally, Section III
of this Comment will propose that an amendment to TRIPS be made which interprets
6 Samantha Shoell, Why Can't the Poor Access Lifesaving Medicines? An Exploration of
Solving the PatentIssue, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 151, 152-53 (2002) (noting that the standard
of care for treating an AIDS patient is a triple drug therapy, which can cost between $11,000 and
$15,000 per year; also mentioning that keeping an AIDS patient alive in Zimbabwe for one year is
twenty-four times the average annual income and that doctors do not even mention these remedies
to patients because they know patients cannot afford them).
7 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) (setting minimal standards of
protection of intellectual property rights to be recognized by all Member countries of the WTO).
s See James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarationon Trips and Public Health
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 291, 292 (2002)
(noting that the Doha Declaration was necessitated in part by the divergent purposes attached by
developing and developed countries to the TRIPS Agreement).
9 World Trade Organization - Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Rights, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, IP/C/W/405 (Aug. 30, 2003) (discussing the availability of compulsory licensing under
Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement).
10Id. at 2 (stating that a Member's obligation under Article 31(f) of TRIPS is waived by grant
of a compulsory license to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of pharmaceutical
products).
I BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (7th ed. 1999) (defining compulsory license as "astatutorily
created license that allows certain parties to use copyrighted material without the explicit
permission of the copyright owner in exchange for a specified royalty").
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adequate remuneration in a manner that promotes the objectives of the Doha
Declaration, while also favoring the grantor of the compulsory license.

I. BACKGROUND
This section will discuss the basis of interpretation issues with TRIPS and how
some countries, such as South Africa, Brazil and India, have instituted laws and
practices that allow compulsory licensing in accordance with their interpretation of
Article 31.
It will then proceed to briefly analyze the new Implementation
Agreement reached on August 30, 2003.

A. The TRIPSAgreement and it's Interpretation
Through the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994, the Member countries of
the WTO sought to implement uniform international protection of intellectual
property rights. 2 The objectives of TRIPS are to promote innovation and the sharing
of the information necessary to understand the innovations, while balancing the
rights of patentees and obligations of patent users in a way beneficial to these
respective groups. 3 The TRIPS Agreement allows Members to "adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition" so
long as they coincide with the
4
provisional foundations set forth in the Agreement.
However, the TRIPS Agreement created a great deal of confusion as to when a
member could grant a compulsory license. 5 The specific provisions that were mainly
in question were Articles 27, 30 and 31 when read separately and in conjunction with
one another. Article 30 provides Members with the opportunity to override a patent
holder's rights in their country as long as this deprivation does not negatively affect

12 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7 (recognizing the need for new rules concerning "the
provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the availability, scope and use of traderelated intellectual property rights" and "of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of
trade-related
intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in national legal systems").
13
So TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 7.
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Id.
11See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 8 (1). "Members may, in formulating or amending
their laws and regulation, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
Id.
1'See Gathii, supra note 8, at 292 (noting that developing countries believed that the TRIPS
Agreement applied to the HIV/AIDS crisis, while the developed countries, such as the United States,
believed that the Agreement only was to apply during the provisional time period until full
compliance with the Agreement was attained).
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the patent holder or his rights. 6 Article 2717 allows exclusions from patentability "to
protect ordre puhlic or morality, including to protect human . . . life." Article 318
provides that unauthorized use of a patent will be permitted in the "case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use." Developing nations would argue that Articles 27 and 31 allow a
country to grant compulsory licenses to license HIV/AIDS drugs because it is saving
or preserving human life. 9

B. The Doha Declaration
In 2001, the WTO addressed the confusion over the extent to which TRIPS
allowed compulsory licensing 2 at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha,
Qatar. 2' Prior to the Conference, two groups of countries submitted proposals on how
to interpret the scope of the TRIPS Agreement to the Council for Trade-Related
Aspects for Intellectual Property Rights ("Council"). 22 However, due to its own recent
actions threatening to issue a compulsory license for Cipro®, the United States'
16 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 30. "Members may provide limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." Id.
17See TRIPS Agreement, supranote 7, art. 27 (2).
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect
ordrepublic or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health
or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is
not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by law.

Id.
18See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 31. When the subject matter of a patent is used
without the authorization of the patent holder, a number of conditions must be met. Id. See Article
31 for a list of these conditions.

19Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement: Balancing
Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 965 (2000). "The justification for the developing
nation's perspective would likely arise out of the exclusions noted in Article 27 of TRIPS." Id.
20 Id. at 964-66 (explaining the wide range of interpretations that developing and developed
nations can attach to the language in Article 31).
21 Divya Murthy, The Future of Compulsory Licensing:Deciphering the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPs Agreement andPublic Health, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1299, 1305 (2002) (noting that the

ministerial text of the Doha Declaration intended to address two issues: the scope of the term
"public health" and the ability of Members without adequate manufacturing capacities to seek the
benefits of compulsory licensing).
22 See World Trade Organization - Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Rights, Draft MinisterialDeclaration,ProposalFrom a Group ofDeveloping Countries, IP/C/W/312,
WT/GC/W/450 (Oct. 4, 2001) (proposing broad use of compulsory licenses to protect public health).
The group of developing countries consisted of The African Group, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Pakistan, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. Id.
See also World Trade

Organization, Draft Ministerial Declaration, Proposal From a Group of Developed Countries,
IP/C/W/313 (Oct. 4, 2001) (proposing a different version without use of the term "compulsory
licensing"). This group comprised of Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the United States.

Id.
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arguments against compulsory licensing under TRIPS were weakened.23 Ultimately,
Members reached two general agreements ("Ministerial Declaration" and "Doha
Declaration"), although neither specifically resolved the issues of interpretation with
TRIPS.
The main Ministerial Declaration stressed once again the severe disadvantage
that developing countries face in the global trade environment.24 Specifically, a
portion of this declaration recognized the importance of interpreting and
implementing TRIPS in a manner supportive of public health.25
In the Doha Declaration, the Members reiterated the need to address public
health problems facing developing and least-developed countries.26
The Doha
Declaration also reaffirmed the right of WTO Members to interpret and implement
TRIPS in a manner consistent with the protection of public health and to promote
access to medicines for all.27 However, one question was left up in the air-what are
countries with no manufacturing capacity to do?28 The Doha Declaration gave an
instruction to the Council for TRIPS to "find an expeditious solution to this problem .
• . before the end of 2002.29 In the meantime, many countries had to take immediate
action to protect their citizens.

23 See Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential US. Policy Shift Toward
Compulsory Licensing ofMedical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism';18 AM. U. INT'L L.

REV. 237, 260 (2002) (discussing the reluctance of the Bush administration to change its anticompulsory licensing policy although it threatened to use such a measure to obtain patent rights to
Cipro in light of the anthrax attack on the United States).
24 World Trade Organization, MinisterialDeclaration,WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
3 (Nov. 20, 2001)
(recalling the commitments made at meetings in Marrakesh to help least developed countries secure
beneficial integration into the international trading system and the global economy in general).
25 Id.
17 (stressing the importance of interpreting and implementing TRIPS in a way
beneficial to the public health, by way of promoting and increasing access to essential medicines).
26 See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) (recognizing the gravity of public health problems afflicting
developing countries and the need for international action to help combat these problems).
27 Id.
4-5 (affirming the right of Members to interpret and implement TRIPS to protect and
promote public health; also, recognizing the right of each member to grant compulsory licenses).
28 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 31.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, art. 31(f),
unauthorized use of a patent "shall be . . . predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of
the Member authorizing such use." Id. This poses a serious problem for those countries that
desperately need patented drugs but have no manufacturing capacity of their own; therefore, they
cannot issue a compulsory license under Article 31. Id.
29 Doha Declaration, supranote 26, at 6 [hereinafter "Paragraph 6"].
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities
in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.
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1. The South Africa Lawsuit
South Africa currently has nearly five million citizens infected with HIV/AIDS. 0
Faced with this unsettling figure and believing that TRIPS permitted them to do so
because it was a national crisis, the South African government proposed an
amendment to the Medicines and Related Substances Act, which allowed compulsory
licensing.3 '
While the United States government (as well as the European
Commission) heavily criticized the decision to enact this amendment,32 it produced
beneficial results for the people of South Africa.33 However, this occurred only after
representatives of various South African pharmaceutical companies filed a lawsuit
against the South African government, which eventually settled. 34 Other countries
sought to achieve similar results by following in the footsteps of the South African
government and its interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.

2. BrazilIndustrialPropertyLaw, Article 68
Brazil is encountering a national health crisis similar to that of South Africa.35
Accordingly, Brazil took comparable actions by enacting a law that permits
compulsory licenses to generic producers of antiretroviral drugs to combat
HIV/AIDS.36 Use of compulsory licenses was, as Brazil believed, within the context of
TRIPS.37 As in South Africa, this interpretation of TRIPS received great attention
from developed countries and beneficiaries of their patent protection systems, this

30 See AIDS to Decimate Life Expectancy, supra note 2 (reporting that eleven percent of the
population of South Africa, roughly 4.7 million, are infected with HIV).
'3 See Ford, supra note 19, at 951 (discussing the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act which permits the South African government to override patents to allow
compulsory licensing for the protection of the public health).
'32
See 'tHoen, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing United States pressure put on the South African
government by withholding trade benefits and threatening further trade sanctions unless the
Medicines Act is repealed; also, noting pressure from the European Commission to do the same).
See South Africa: Drug Firms Drop PatentSuit, Facts on File World News Digest, April 19,
2001, 297E3 (noting that the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, which represented thirtynine South African drug manufacturers, had begun to negotiate price reductions with fifty countries
for AIDS drugs).
34 See 't Hoen, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that in February 1998 the South African
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and forty multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers
brought suit against the government of South Africa alleging that the Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act was unconstitutional and violated TRIPS).
'35 See t'Hoen, supra note 3, at 32 (stating that approximately 500,000 people in Brazil are
infected with HIV, only twenty percent of whom are receiving treatment).
36 World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,
Brazil Measure Affecting Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). The United States complained
that Article 68 of Brazil's 1996 industrial property law (Law No. 9,279 of 14 May 1996; effective May
1997), requires that a patented product be produced in Brazil, otherwise it can be the subject of a
compulsory license, which the United States believed was violative of WTO agreements. Id.
37 See 't Hoen, supra note 3, at 33 (stating that Brazil believed its Article 68 and compulsory
licensing are in line with TRIPS and Article 5.4 of the Paris Convention).
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time in the form of an action before the WTO38 by the United States government.3 9
However, the United States ultimately dropped its action against Brazil due to
widespread criticism from
various groups 40 advocating the increase of access to drugs
4
'
countries.
in developing
Although the WTO never had the opportunity to clarify the scope of compulsory
licensing under TRIPS because the United States dropped the suit, the Brazilian
government nevertheless benefited from enacting the law 42 and maintained their
successful HIV/AIDS treatment programs. 43

3.Other Countries'Responsesto Issues of PublicHealth
Other countries also have implemented legislative acts to allow compulsory
licenses of pharmaceutical products, including India.44 However, these actions by the
Indian government came under heavy criticism from the United States and the
European Community, and the WTO ultimately chastised India's actions.45
38 See World Trade
Organization: Settling Disputes, at http://www.wto.org/English/
thewto e/whatis e/tif e/displ e.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). Dispute settlement is used if one
member believes fellow members are violating trade rules by adopting a trade policy, e.g.
compulsory licensing, that one member considers to be breaking WTO agreements. Id.
'39See Request for the Estabhlishment ofa Panel by the UnitedStates, supra note 36 (charging
that Article 68 of Brazil's industrial property law, supra note 35, discriminates against U.S. owners
of Brazilian patents and is therefore in violation of TRIPS).
40 See Treatment Action Campaign, TAC Statement on US ComplaintAgainst Brazil at WTO,

at http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/Statements/usvsbrzl.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (calling
the United States' action against Brazil "the continuation of bullying weaker nations in pursuit of
narrowly defined US commercial interests"); Consumer Project on Technology, Statement on the
Trade Dispute Between the United States and Brazil, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/
CPTstatement.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (setting forth several reasons why the United States
should not have filed a WTO action against Brazil).
1' Peng Jiang, Fighting the AIDS Epidemic: Chinas Options Under the WTO TRIPS
Agreement, 13 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 223, 239 (2002) (suggesting that the United States dropped
its suit against Brazil before the WTO due to widespread criticism from various groups advocating
better access to AIDS drugs in developing countries in exchange for Brazil's agreement to hold talks
with the United States government before granting compulsory licenses on patents owned by United
States companies).
12 See John Donnelly, Brazil Wins Big Price Cut in AIDS Drug Trade-Law Tactic Could Be
Model, Health Chiefs Says, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2001, at Al (discussing the fact that Brazil
threatened to issue a compulsory license of a Swiss drug, which forced the company to lower prices,
saving Brazil $35.4 million a year).
43 Jiang, supra note 41, at 238-39 (stating that as a result of generic competition, the prices of
AIDS drugs fell by seventy-nine percent over five years; that the Brazil AIDS program reduced
AIDS-related mortality rates by more than fifty percent in three years; and that Brazil continues to
negotiate lower prices for drugs through the threat of compulsory licenses).
44 Andrea M. Curti, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:An Unlikely Weapon in the
Fight Against AIDS, 27 AM. J.L. AND MED. 469, 477-78 (2001) (noting that India has numerous
generic producers of products patented in Western countries because it allows for compulsory
licensing due to its designation as a developing country).
4 Id. (discussing that both the United States and the European Community brought claims
against India before a WTO panel for failing to meet its transitional obligations, both actions
resulted in decisions against India).
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Thailand also sought to battle its HIV/AIDS problem through a provision that
permitted the granting of compulsory licenses. 46 However, it never used this
provision out of a fear that the United States would impose trade sanctions against
Thailand.4 7 Due to mounting international pressure48 , the United States announced
that it would not impose trade sanctions if the Thai government chose to utilize
compulsory licenses to produce generic HIV/AIDS drugs.49
The implementation of laws allowing compulsory licensing in these countries
made it necessary for the WTO to consider formally interpreting or amending TRIPS
to ensure that its purposes would be carried out regardless of the uncertain outcome
of any possible disputes.

C Implementation ofParagraph6- Content ofAugust 30 Agreement
Due to these actions of various governments, there was an implicit call to the
Council on TRIPS to make changes to facilitate developing and least-developed
countries in their quest to obtain access to drugs for their citizens. The Council50
attempted to answer these requests on a number of occasions, but to no avail.
However, almost two years after the Doha Declaration urged the Council to find an
"expeditious solution" to the problem of implementation of TRIPS, Members adopted
an agreement on the interpretation of ambiguous TRIPS Articles ("Implementation
Agreement") .51

16 See Jiang, supra note 41, at 240 (discussing an amendment that gave a Pharmaceutical
Patents Board authority to grant compulsory licenses).
47 See Jiang, supra note 41, at 240.
48 See Third World Network, NGOs Denounce Northern Pressures Against Compulsory
Licensing, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/1879cn.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (noting that
leading non-governmental organizations, such as Medicins Sans Frontieres, Health Action
International and Consumer Project on Technology, denounced threats and pressures by the United
States and other governments for trade disputes with Thailand and South Africa involving
compulsory licensing).
49 See Jiang, supra note 41, at 240 n.128 (noting that the Thai government was still awaiting
assurances from the United States before it issued a compulsory license).
50 Daniel Pruzin, NGOs Say WTO TRIPs/Medicine Formula No Cure for Drug Dearthin Poor
Countries,PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA), Sept. 2, 2003 (noting that WTO Members
were to finalize an agreement on December 16, 2002, but the United States opposed it because the
United States believed the range of diseases to be covered was too open-ended). See also World
Trade Organization, Trips and Public Health: the Situation Before Caneun available at
http://www.wto.int/English/tratop-e/trips-e/health-background-e.htm
(last visited Sep. 21, 2003)
(pointing out that the TRIPS Council attempted to resolve this issue in January and February 2003,
but failed).
,ri See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9. This agreement recognizes the charge set
forth in the Doha Declaration to find an expeditious solution to the problem of compulsory licensing
for countries with little or no manufacturing capacity. Id. It goes on to define pertinent terms and
obligations imposed on Members who use the compulsory licensing provisions, including that the
"importing Member" notify the Council when such a license is granted and the requirements of a
compulsory license for an "exporting Member". Id. at 2.
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The General Council Chairperson issued a separate statement to clarify certain
points of the Implementation Agreement.'' These two documents comprise the
agreement that Members adopted on August 30, 2003.
Developing and developed countries alike reacted positively to the
Implementation Agreement; 53 however, some countries permanently opted out of
utilizing the provisions of the agreement.54 Pharmaceutical companies around the
world also welcomed the Implementation Agreement with open arms, hoping that it
would increase access to essential drugs for impoverished people, as well as improve
their public image. 55 However, non-governmental organizations were not as content
with the Implementation Agreement, quickly pointing out the problems that it
contained,56 as well as other problems that developing countries still faced in getting
access to essential drugs.57
52

World Trade Organization, The General Council Chairperson's Statement, (Aug. 30, 2003)

available at http://www.wto.org/Englisl/news-e/news03_e/trips-stat 28aug03 e.htm.
Advising
Members that (1) the agreement should be used in good faith to protect public health and that in
order for it to work; (2) importing countries must implement adequate measure to prevent diversion
of generic drugs to other markets; (3) members should resolve any disputes as quickly and smoothly
as possible; and (4) that the TRIPS Council will review the implementation of this agreement
annually.
53 See European Trade Commission, Access to Essential Medicines: EU Strongly Welcomes
WTO Deal on Generic Medicines, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/medicine/
medic010903 en.htm (Oct. 2, 2003) (proclaiming that the EU welcomes the August 30 agreement to
improve access to medicines for developing countries); TRIPS and PublicHealth STATEMENT OF
INDIA, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/indiaO92003.html (Oct. 2, 2003) (stating that India is
delighted to join in with other Members in adoption of the August 30 agreement).
Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 2. Within the meaning of "exporting member,"
the agreement notes that certain countries will not use the system in this Decision. These countries
consist of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 2, n.3; Espicom Business
Intelligence, WTO reaches agreementon pharmaceuticalIP issues (Sept. 1, 2003) (adding that until
their accession to the European Union ("EU"), the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia would only utilize the benefit of
the decision in the event of a national emergency; and after their accession to the EU, they will opt
out of using the system as the twenty-three countries mentioned above; also other countries
announced that they would use the system only in urgent emergency situations, including Chinese
Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Chinese Macao, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, and
United Arab Emirates).
55See European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA Statement
on Compulsory License for Export ('Paragraph6" of Doha Declarationon TRIPs & Public Health),
available at http://www.efpia.org/3-press/20030830.htm (Aug. 30, 2003) (stating that the conclusion
of the negotiations should be "welcomed by all committed to the success of the Doha Development
Agenda"); see also Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Statement from Senior
Vice President,InternationalAffairs in Reaction to the Successful Conclusion of the Negotiations on
TRIPS and Public Health, available at http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/
30.08.2003.841.efm (Aug. 30, 2003) (expressing its pleasure that Members were able to find common
ground in clarifying past issues in TRIPS).
56 See Joint NGO Statement of TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deal on Medicines.*A "Gift"
Bound in Red Tape, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngosO9102OO3.html (Oct. 2, 2003)
(suggesting that the August 30 agreement was nothing more than a public relations exercise that
created many problems, including: requiring issuance of two compulsory licenses; constraints on
generic drug manufacturers; creating uncertainty as to the role that generic drug manufacturers are
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The journey of TRIPS appears to have hit some smooth pavement during an
otherwise bumpy trip. As this trip continues, are there still holes in the road ahead,
or is it a road that developing countries must pave for themselves?

II. ANALYSIS
This section will briefly analyze the accomplishments and pitfalls of the
Implementation Agreement. Under the Implementation Agreement and TRIPS, use
of compulsory licensing to protect the public health mandates that the licensee pay
adequate remuneration for use of the patent, among many other conditions.5 8 It will
then look at adequate remuneration and review decisions from U.S. courts on
analogous topics. Finally, this section will evaluate the policy concerns underlying
the developed and developing countries' different interpretations of adequate
remuneration.

A. Decision ofAugust 30, 2003 - The Implementation Agreement plus the
Chairperson'sStatement
Again recognizing the gravity of the public health problems affecting developing
and least developed countries and the importance of the protection of intellectual
property rights, Members of the WTO adopted the Implementation Agreement.

1. What did the Implementation Agreement do?
The Implementation Agreement
defines numerous terms, including
"pharmaceutical product," "eligible importing Member," and "exporting Member."5' 9
playing; and, whether economic problems constitute a ground for finding that a country lacks
manufacturing capacity).

57 See Oxfam International, Flawed WTO Drugs Deal Will Do Little to Secure Future Access to
Medcines in Developing Countries,available at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pr03O830_wto-final.htm
(Sept. 21, 2003) (commenting that the new system is burdensome and does nothing to ensure that
generic production will happen in the future; developing countries will have no alternative to high
prices of brand-name pharmaceuticals).
,8 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 3. Requiring that where a compulsory
license is granted by a Member, "adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be paid ... taking into account the economic value to the importing Member of the
use of that has been authorized in the exporting Member." Id. See also TRIPSAgreement, supra
note 7, art. 31(h). Similarly requiring that when the subject matter of a patent is used without
authorization of the patent holder, "the right[s] holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of authorization." -d.
5 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 1-2.
For the purposes of this Decision:
"pharmaceutical product" means any patented product, or product
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to
address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the
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First, the Implementation Agreement makes compulsory licensing easily accessible
to least developed countries by defining an eligible importing Member as "any least
developed country Member, 60 without any further requirements.
Second, it waives the requirement of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement that
when a compulsory license is used, it must be predominantly for supply of the
domestic market.6' For this waiver to occur, both the eligible importing Member62
and the exporting Member 63 must meet a number of conditions. Furthermore, the

Declaration.
It is understood that active ingredients necessary for its
manufacture and diagnostic kits needed for its use would be included;
"eligible importing Member" means any least developed country Member,
and any other Member that has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS of its
intention to use the system as an importer, it being understood that a Member
may notify at any time that it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, for
example only in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.[remainder not
included]
'exporting Member" means a Member using the system set out in this
Decision to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, and eligible
importing Member.
Id.
60 See World Trade Organization, Least Developed Countries (Nov.
2003) at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org7_e.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003). Listing
the least developed countries that are Members of the WTO as Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda and Zambia. Id. The following countries are in the process of accession to the WTO:
Bhutan, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Laos, Nepal, Samoa, Sudan, Vanuatu and Yemen. Id.
61 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 2. "The obligations of an exporting Member
under Article 31(Q) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a
compulsory license...." Id.
62 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 2. The Decision sets out conditions to be
met by the eligible importing Member, including that it:
) specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed;
(ii) confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a
least-developed country Member, has established that it has insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in
question in one of the ways set out in the Annex of this Decision; and
(iii) confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its
territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence in accordance
with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of this Decision.
Id.
63 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 3.
[T]he exporting Member shall notify the Council for TRIPS of the grant of
the licence, including the conditions attached to it. The information provided
shall include the name and address of licensee, the product(s) for which the
licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the
country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of
licence. The notification shall also indicate the address of the website referred to
in subparagraph (b)(iii) above.
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Implementation Agreement sets out numerous conditions that the compulsory license
itself must incorporate.64
The Implementation Agreement also clears up some prior concerns of double
compensation to the patent holder that a Member would encounter under the
requirement of adequate remuneration in Article 31(h). 65
In addition, the
Implementation Agreement states that importing Members are to take reasonable
measures to prevent re-exportation of the products that they have imported under a
compulsory license.66 It also provides that Members shall assist one another in
preventing re-exportation from occurring; and, if a Member has a problem with
another Members' compliance with this requirement, that Member may bring the
issue before the Council for TRIPS for review.67
Further, the General Council Chairperson's Statement clarifies that Members
are to implement the Decision in good faith to protect the public health.68
61Soo Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 2.
[T]he compulsory licence issued by the exporting Member under this
Decision shall contain the following conditions:
(i) only the amount necessary to meet the needs of eligible importing
Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this
production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs to the
Council for TRIPS;
(ii) products produced under the licence shall be clearly identified as being
produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific labeling or
marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products through special packaging
and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that such
distinction is feasible and does not have a significant impact on price; and
(iii) before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website the
following information:
- the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in indent (i)
above; and
- the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii) above;

Td.
65

See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 3.
Where a compulsory licence is granted by an exporting Member under the
system set out in this Decision, adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h)
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be paid in that Member taking into account the
economic value to the importing Member. Where a compulsory licence is granted
for the same products in the eligible importing Member, the obligation of that
Member under Article 3 1(h) shall be waived in respect of those products for which
remuneration in accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph is paid in
the exporting Member.

Id. (emphasis added)
66See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 3. The Decision states that to ensure that
products which are granted under a compulsory license are used for the public health purposes
underlying the license, "eligible importing Members shall take reasonable measures within their
means, proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent
re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into their territories under the
system." Td.
67 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 3. This provision states that if an eligible
importing Member is having difficulty implementing adequate measures to prevent re-exportation,
"developed country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions,
technical and financial cooperation in order to facilitate its implementation." Id.
68

See Genera] Council Chairperson'sStatement, supra note 52.
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Furthermore, it suggests that any disputes arising between Members be resolved
"expeditiously and amicably. 69

2. What are Some PotentialProblems with the Implementation Agreement?
As recently observed by one commentator, there are problems with the new
Decision. 7 Among these problems are the possibilities for delay, the fact that two
Member countries will have to obtain compulsory licenses, and an increase in
transaction costs. 7' That commentator also notes that a few things remain uncertain,
such as the self-determination of inadequate manufacturing capacity by a developing
country, and also how compensation to the patent holder is to be calculated. 72 The
remainder of this Comment will discuss the latter of these two uncertainties and look
at relevant policy concerns of both developing and developed countries. It will also
look at United States case law for a possible interpretation of "adequate
remuneration" to be included in a proposed amendment to TRIPS.

B. Cases Decidedin the UnitedStates Under 28 U.S.C.§ 1498
One method of finding and analyzing the meaning of adequate remuneration is
by examining cases brought against the United States government due to its
compulsory licensing of U.S. patents. Title 28, section 1498 of the United States
Code 73 allows the United States government to use a patentee's invention without his
permission, in other words, to issue a compulsory license. 74 As a remedy for this
action, the statute provides that the patentee shall be entitled to "reasonable and
entire compensation. '75 The courts have set forth numerous guidelines and factors to
be considered in determining what reasonable and entire compensation entails.
One notable case involving this statute is Leesona v. U.S. Leesona filed an
infringement suit against the United States government for taking its patent rights
69See Genera] Council Chairperson'sStatement, supra note 52.
70 See Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Exportation of Drugs Under Compulsory Licenses: The
WTO Decision on Implementation ofParagraph6 of the Doha Deelarationon the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health (Oct. 3, 2003), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/hiv aids/docs.GflAPnote

10.03.03.pdf.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2003). This report analyzes the Decision as a whole, as well as
the individual provisions themselves. Id.
71 Id. at 8-9.
72 Id. at 10.
73 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy
shall be action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal
Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use
and manufacture.
Id. (emphasis added).
74 Id.
75 Td,
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76
to mechanically rechargeable metal-air batteries without Leesona's permission.
The trial court found that the patents were valid and infringed and awarded Leesona
royalties, attorneys' fees, and lost profits.77 On appeal, regarding the issue of
reasonable compensation, the court found that the award was excessive because the
trial judge assumed the claim was to be decided under Title 35, section 284 of the
Code.78
The court found that the taking of patent rights by the government was
analogous to an eminent domain taking under the Fifth Amendment, which requires

just compensation to the victim.

79

The court went on to discuss that, traditionally,

courts view such an action as a "compulsory compensable license" in the patent 0 and
that just compensation is defined as a "reasonable royalty" for that license-another
method of estimating the value lost.8 Additionally, the court noted that eminent
domain takings are necessary for the protection of the public health, and that a court
should base compensation on what the owner has lost, not what the taker has
gained.82
The case of StandardManufacturing,Co. v. United States is a recent case that
further elaborated on Leesona and displayed a practical application of reasonable
royalty. 3 The court determined that the plaintiffs patent was infringed and the
plaintiff moved for damages.8 4 The court stated that a reasonable royalty is "the
amount a person who desires to manufacture, use, or sell a patented article would be
willing to pay as a royalty and yet still be able to make a reasonable profit."5 In
determining an amount, the court reiterated precedent, which states that a court
should first look to an established royalty, and second, the court should perform a
hypothetical negotiation between the parties. The court also found that there are

76 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 963 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
77 Id. at 962.
7S Id. The court commented that infringement by the government is not the same as a tort
claim for infringement between private parties and therefore damages should not be decided under
35 U.S.C. § 284. Id. at 964. The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which authorizes governmental
infringement, does not have a similar purpose or foundation as Title 35 and should not be read in
addition to § 1498 in calculating damages because that would give the patent holder compensation
in excess of just compensation. Id. at 968-69.
79 Id. at 964. The court noted that whenever the government has infringed a patent, it is
considered to be a taking under the Fifth Amendment; therefore, just compensation to the patent
holder is required. Id.
80 Id. at 968.
81 Id.

82 Id. at

969.
Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 767-775 (Ct. Cl. 1999). The court
applied every factor from Goorgia-Pacifeto the facts before it. Id. The court also noted that it has
discretion to consider additional factors, such as "non-infringing alternatives" and "reducing the
royalty rate when the government procurement is voluminous." Id. at 764.
81 Id. at 751.
83

85 Id. at

759.

86 Id. at 762.
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87
many factors that are relevant to the determination of a reasonable royalty,
including those set forth in Georgia-PacificCorp. v. United States Plywood Corp.8
A recent example of governments issuing (or threatening to issue) compulsory
licenses can be found in the wake of the September 11, 2001 tragedy in the United

87 Id. at

763.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). In finding that the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs patent, the court set forth the
following fifteen factors for the court to consider in the determination of a reasonable royalty in a
patent infringement case:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to
the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted to non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his
patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or
whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such a derivative
or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those
who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in
the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features of improvements added by the
infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as
the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time infringement began) if both
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the
amount which a prudent licensee - who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention - would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
88
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States. The governments of the United States and Canada threatened to exercise
their powers to override Bayer's rights to the patent on Cipro89 and issue compulsory
licenses. 9 This was in response to the anthrax attacks unleashed on America in
20019' and done to ensure that the public was well protected. 92 However, Bayer
significantly reduced its prices on Cipro under the threat of an eminent domain
taking before any compulsory licenses were issued. 93
In light of the foregoing discussion, one can see that there is a logical and strong
relationship between § 1498 and the TRIPS Agreement. The WTO should view
compulsory licensing and the determination of adequate remuneration under TRIPS
in a way similar to governmental compulsory licensing. As stated in Leesona,
takings of patent rights under § 1498 are viewed as an eminent domain taking under
the Fifth Amendment.94 Eminent domain is defined as "the inherent power of a
governmental entity to take privately owned property and convert it to public use,
subject to reasonable compensations for the taking."95 Within the Fifth Amendment,
the governmental entity is the United States, however, under TRIPS, the WTO is the
"governmental entity" that converts the patent to public use. Due to this similarity,
the principles set forth in United States case law regarding governmental compulsory
licenses and just compensation in eminent domain takings of patent rights are
important considerations when deciding what adequate remuneration should be
under TRIPS.

C Decisionsof US. Courts Under 35 US .§284
Private infringement actions 96 are another area of intellectual property to
evaluate when determining what constitutes adequate remuneration. Under § 284,

89See Cipro News Archives, FDA Approves CQprolloxacinfor Victims ofAnthrax Inhalation,at
http://www.ciprousa.com/news/press anthrax release.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). Ciprofloxacin,
also known as Cipro, is a standard treatment for individuals exposed to anthrax. Id.
90 See Resnik, supra note 5. Canada and the United States considered overriding Bayer's
patent rights to Cipro, and Canada actually did override it for a few days until an agreement was
reached with Bayer. Id.
91 See Editorial, The SpreadingAnthrax To]],WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2001, at A24 (referring to
the anthrax laced letters sent to NBC anchor Tom Brokaw, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle,
and the New York Post, which "shut down Congress," White House officials still suspected a link
between these attacks and the September 11 attacks).
92 See Consumer Project on Technology, Talking Points on C/pro Patent Dispute, at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/talkingpoints.html (Oct. 24, 2001). The Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, requested 1.2 billion pills to treat ten million Americans.

Id.
93 See Resnik, supra note 5. By October 2001, Bayer had reduced its price of Cipro more than
seventy percent as a result of its agreements with the United States and Canada. Id.
91 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." Id.
95See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999).
96 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). Section (a) provides that "whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." Id.
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when a court determines that infringement has occurred, it must award the patentee
"damages adequate to compensate for the infringement. ''9 The courts consistently
recognize two ways to calculate damages-actual damages or reasonable royalty.98
While the courts utilize the same "hypothetical negotiation" approach under § 284 as
they do under § 1498, there are some principles that are noteworthy when
interpreting what constitutes adequate remuneration under TRIPS.
First, courts have cautioned that a hypothetical willing-buyer/willing-seller
negotiation "necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty."'99
What is reasonable under all circumstances 0 and the relevant factors expressed in
Georgia-Pacificare additional considerations in determining a reasonable royalty.'
The court in Golight found that because a court imposes a hypothetical negotiation
on the plaintiff it amounts to a form of compulsory licensing.' 2 This finding makes
these considerations all the more relevant in the present context.
Based on these decisions, it is necessary to point out some relevant factors in
deciding what adequate remuneration is under the TRIPS Agreement.
Most
importantly, it must be stressed that the circumstances under which such a license
will be granted are ominous, to say the least. The licensee is presumably using a
compulsory license to protect the public health for a legitimate reason, as is required
by the WTO. Also, the reason for which the license is being granted is likely that one
country (or its citizens) cannot afford to buy drugs from Western pharmaceutical
companies. It is in light of these circumstances and the following policy concerns
that the WTO must amend the TRIPS Agreement to clearly define adequate
remuneration.

The statute also provides for contributory infringement, and safe harbors, including an experimental
use exception. Id.
97 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). "Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court." Id.
98 Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In this case, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding of infringement, but held that the plaintiff was not entitled
to lost profits; rather, it was entitled to a reasonable royalty to be determined on remand to the
district court. Id. at 1448. The court also noted that the plaintiff was required to present evidence
of a reasonable royalty based upon a hypothetical negotiation. Id. at 1447.
99 Unisplay S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that although
there is uncertainty involved, the trier of fact must determine a reasonable royalty on a factual
basis).
100 See Trelt 912 F.2d at 1446 (discussing considerations in performing a hypothetical
negotiation, the court stated that a district court can hear evidence on anticipated profits, expert
testimony, and what rate the patentee would have charged for a license, but eventually the
determination comes down to what is reasonable under all the circumstances).
101 UnisplayS.A., 69 F.3d at 517 n.7 (recognizing that a determination of reasonable royalty by
a trier of fact must be supported by the relevant evidence and that relevant factors are those set out
in GeorgiaPaciic).
102 Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1183 (D. Colo. 2002). In a
private infringement action, the court analyzed the hypothetical negotiation between a willing
licensor and a willing licensee. Id. at 1182. The court found that this approach is used as a tool in
assessing damages in accordance with § 284. Id. at 1183.
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D. Policy Concerns of Developed and Least Developed Countries

1. Developed CountriesDemand Full Compensation
Developed countries, where most major pharmaceutical companies reside, posit
that if developing and least developed countries are to grant compulsory licenses, full
compensation to the patent holder is required. 3 They advance numerous reasons for
this position, including that their patent rights are diminished, thereby discouraging
innovation, and that sales to the patent holder are lost through parallel importing.104
One of the most persuasive arguments for full compensation is that it increases
the incentive for pharmaceutical companies to develop new and useful products.
Pharmaceutical companies spend hundreds of millions of dollars on research and
development of multiple drugs every year.0 5 Of these drugs, only one out of ten that
is approved by the FDA recovers the cost of research and development from inception
to marketing, which is typically around $500 million.0 6 The essence of the argument
is that patentees receive a monopoly for their new ideas and when this monopoly is
eviscerated through compulsory licensing, they lose the most meaningful right
accorded by their patent-the right to exclude. 0 7 One statute supporting this view
is 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which permits compulsory licensing with adequate
compensation.10 ' This being said, pharmaceutical companies also maintain that they
will lose profits if compulsory licensing is allowed, further justifying full
compensation.
The pharmaceutical companies, through developed countries' governments, also
maintain that not awarding them full compensation amounts to a taking of their

103 See Nabila Ansari, InternationalPatentRights in a Post-Doha World 11 CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 57, 59 (2002). This article notes that developed countries are concerned with the
pirating of their innovations.
This is because use of one's patent without authorization or
compensation to the patent holder results in a loss of profits, thereby stifling innovation of new
products. Id.

104 Id.
105 See Jerry Stanton, Lessons for the United States from Foreign Price Controls on
Pharmaceuticals,16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 155 (2000). This article reports on the current state of

pharmaceutical production. It also looks at various ways that the government can control prices on
pharmaceuticals and the affects of such controls, concluding that government price controls may
violate the exclusive rights provision of the Constitution's patent clause. Id. at 170.
106 Id. at 155.
107 See Kara M. Bombach, Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling the South African
Medicines and Related Substances Act With the Trips Agreement, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273, 282
(2001). The U.S. Constitution states the purpose of intellectual property protection is "to Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The South African law
that permits compulsory licensing is contrary to this purpose and thereby creates a disincentive to
innovate. See Bombach, at 282.
108 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
This statute involves compulsory licensing by the U.S.
government. It states in section (a) that recovery by the patent holder shall be his "reasonable and
entire compensation for such use and manufacture," including reasonable costs in pursuing the
action. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). This statute awards no less than a reasonable royalty,
plus interest and costs, to a prevailing patent holder in a private infringement action. Td.
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profits. 10 9 They claim this situation exists because if compulsory licensees make
patented drugs, those drugs may be diverted into other countries where a market for
them already exists and they may be sold at lower prices.110 This practice is known
as parallel importing"' and can significantly undercut the profits of the patent
holder." 2 By not giving full compensation, parallel importation is thus further
injuring the patent holder.
However, the General Council Chairperson's statement stresses that Members
are to utilize the Decision in good faith to protect the public health and not to
promote economic growth." 3 The Implementation Agreement also provides that
"eligible importing Members shall take reasonable measures within their means ...
to prevent re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into their
territories" and also "developed country Members shall provide . . . technical and
financial cooperation in order to facilitate its implementation.""1 4 Idealistically, there
is no reason to believe that Member countries will not act in good faith to fully
comply with these provisions. Therefore, developed countries should not expect this
to occur or use it as a basis for demanding more compensation for a compulsory
license than is just.

2. Developing & Least Developed CountriesRequest No/Low Compensation

At the other end of the spectrum, developing and least developed countries
propose that the patent holder receive no, or at most minimal, remuneration for use
of the patent.
Granting adequate remuneration in the form of full market value, as developing
countries urge, would not only be contradictory to the TRIPS Agreement and the
Doha Declaration, but would also give the patent holders a windfall by enabling them
to reap profits in a market where there were none previously." 5 The fact that least

109 See Ansari, supra note 103.
IC0 See

M See

id.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (7th ed. 1999). Defining parallel imports as "[gioods
bearing valid trademarks that are manufactured abroad and imported into the United States to
compete with domestically manufactured goods bearing the same valid trademark." Id. Here, we
are dealing with patents that are imported from the compulsory licensee to markets in which the
patent holder has enforceable rights.
112 See George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in InternationalPatentProtection:
The US. and India in the UruguayRound and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
283, 297-98 (1998) (noting that foreign copiers reduce annual revenues from foreign sales by nearly
$5 billion).
1:3See General Council Chairperson'sStatement, supra note 52. "Members recognize that the
system that will be established by the Decision should be used in good faith to protectpublichealth
and, without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the Decision, not to be an instrument to pursue industrial
or commercialpoliey objectives." Id. (emphasis added).
111See Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 3.
115 See Judy Rein, InternationalGovernance Through Trade Agreements:Patent Protectionfor
EssentialMedicines, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 379, 404 (2001). The author noted that commercial
pharmaceutical producers do not address diseases suffered by countries with no purchasing power
because there is a lack of demand and there is no chance to recover the expenses of research and
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developed countries are not presently a major percentage of the pharmaceutical
marketplace supports the argument for little or no remuneration to the patent
holder. 16

The emotional thrust of the least developed countries' argument for low or no
remuneration comes from words put forth by the WTO in the Implementation
Agreement, TRIPS, and the Doha Declaration. In these documents, the WTO
consistently stressed the importance of interpreting its documents in a manner
consistent with protection of public health." 7 The General Council Chairperson's
Statement recites that "the system [established] by the Decision should be used in
good faith to protect the public health" and in conjunction with the objectives of
TRIPS."'
The objectives of TRIPS-to promote protection of intellectual property rights
and public health-can be conflicting when trying to interpret "adequate
remuneration.""' 9 On the one hand, the developed countries want to protect their
intellectual property rights and investments, which means full compensation and
prices too high for impoverished individuals to afford. On the other hand, developing
countries want to increase access to essential medicines at minimal costs. It is in
light of these views that the WTO must determine a clear and definite meaning of
adequate remuneration.
From the above-mentioned sources and through the WTO, Members must reach
an agreement as to what constitutes adequate remuneration under the TRIPS
Agreement. The next section will propose that the WTO amend TRIPS to clearly and
unambiguously define adequate remuneration in light of the above discussion.

III. PROPOSAL: THE WTO SHOULD AMEND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT & INCLUDE A
DEFINITE DETERMINATION FOR ADEQUATE REMUNERATION TO THE PATENT HOLDER

development. Id. AIDS is an anomaly because although most of the sufferers are in developing
countries, AIDS drugs are developed for those afflicted in developed countries. Id. at 405.
116See Lanjouw, supra note 4, at 90. Citing empirical evidence that the profit derived from
having full patent protection and sales in a poor country are marginal when compared to the total
profits of the same drug worldwide. Id. The result of this is that the incentive to create new drugs
does not come from sales in poor countries; rather, the meaningful profits come from the developed
countries. Id.
11 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 8 (1); Doha Declaration, supra note 26,
4;
General Chairpersons Statement, supra note 52.
1IsSee General Council Chairperson'sStatement, supra note 52.
119See Arvind Subramanian, The AIDS Crisis, DifferentialPricingof Drugs, and the TRIPS
Agreement, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 323, 331 (2001) (discussing numerous examples and
hypothetical situations in which compulsory licensing will or will not work). Subramanian also
notes that "there is an inherent contradiction between compulsory licensing, which aims to increase
competition and reduce prices, and a profit-based standard for compensation that would preserve
the monopoly right[s] of the patent." Id. The article proceeds to find that a "simple" mathematical
formula can solve the debate, and that pharmaceutical companies should charge different prices
within a given country, depending on whether the customer is rich or poor. -d. at 336.
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This section will propose that the WTO should amend 20 the TRIPS Agreement
to include a definite determination of adequate remuneration that in large part
reflects the objectives of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration to protect the public
health, as well as the concerns of those countries who will exercise this privilege for
their own benefit. WTO Members will have to face this issue in the future when they
amend TRIPS in accordance with the Implementation Agreement. 2 ' Failure to
unambiguously define adequate remuneration for the purposes of compulsory
licensing will inevitably result in actions before the Dispute Settlement Board'22 of
the WTO, which will give rise to further delays in providing medicines to those who
need them. It will also result in increased transaction costs for those Members
utilizing compulsory licenses, thereby23defeating the purpose of increasing access to
medicine for those Members' citizens.1
In defining adequate remuneration, the WTO should limit the amount of
compensation to the patent holder to a small royalty rate to allow the compulsory
licensee to retain significant profits, rather than the ordinary calculation of a

120

So

Agreement

Establishing

the

Multilateral

Trade

Organization

[World

Trade

Organization], Dec. 15, 1993, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter "WTO Agreement"].
Amendments to provisions of this Agreement, or the Multilateral Trade
Agreements in Annexes 1A and 1C, other than those listed in paragraphs 2 and 6,
of a nature that would alter the rights and obligations of the Members, shall take
effect for the Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by two-thirds of
the Members and thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it. The
Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourths majority of the Members
that any amendment made effective under this paragraph is of such a nature that
any Member which has not accepted it within a period specified by the Ministerial
Conference in each case, shall be free to withdraw from the MTO or to remain a
Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference.
Id. at art. X, 3. See also, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 71 (2).
Amendments merely serving the purpose of adjusting to higher levels of
protection of intellectual property rights achieved, and in force, in other
multilateral agreements and accepted under those agreements by all Members of
the WTO may be referred to the Ministerial Conference for action in accordance
with paragraph 6 of Article X of the WTO Agreement on the basis of a consensus
proposal from the council for TRIPS.
Id.
121 So Implementation Agreement, supra note 9, at 4.
The Agreement states that "[t]his
Decision, including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for each Member on the date on which
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that Member." Id.
It also further directs the TRIPS Council to initiate by the end of 2003 preparation of such an
amendment based on the Implementation Agreement with its adoption within six months. Id.
122 See World Trade
Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/displ e.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). The
Dispute Settlement Body consists of WTO Members who resolve disputes between Members when
one country takes some action that the other believes violate WTO policy or regulations. Id.
123 See Van Puymbroeck, supra note 70, at 9.
In discussing the potential problems of the
Implementation Agreement, the author notes that increased transaction costs will result under the
new system. Id. This is because action is required by two governments now, the importing and
exporting Member, as well as by the generic manufacturer. Id.
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reasonable royalty. 2 4 In looking at all the circumstances surrounding a compulsory
license granted under TRIPS, it is apparent that the patent holder should receive
minimal compensation. Because the WTO is a "governmental entity,"'25 and a
compulsory license is analogous to an eminent domain taking for the protection of the
public health, compensation for this allocation should not be the same as that for
private infringement. Rather, it should be calculated in accordance with what it is, a
taking by the government, and therefore compensation should only be "just." This
contention is also supported when
the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement and the
26
result of the license are observed.
Therefore, in considering what to award the patent holder, several factors
suggest that the patent holder receive low compensation. First, the nature and scope
of the license require that the compensation is reduced. 27 The license here would be
restricted as to where and to whom the product may be sold (it would only be sold to
the citizens of the country to whom the compulsory license was issued). Second, the
fact that the patent holder is making little, if any, profit is of the utmost importance
and further suggests reduced compensation. Also, the parties might have negotiated
if they were both willing to reach an agreement-in good faith and with the
objectives of TRIPS in mind. In this situation, the compensation would be lower than
it would be in a normal commercial setting.'2 8 Additionally, these factors should not
constrain the WTO, and it should
consider any other relevant factors that members
29
enumerate in amending TRIPS.
For these reasons, the WTO should base adequate remuneration on a very small
royalty rate in order to establish a definite and certain result that Members can rely
upon. It is important that the manufacturer producing the drugs is able to retain
124 See Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 759 (Ct. Cl. 1999). The court
found that a reasonable royalty is the "amount that a person who desires to manufacture, use, or
sell a patented article would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet still be able to make a reasonable
profit." Id. The court also noted that all the facts of a particular case are important to the
calculation, which involves a two step process: "(1) determination of a reasonable compensation, i.e.,
the total value of the infringing items on which the plaintiffs are entitled to royalty payments, and
(2) determination of a reasonable royalty rate to apply to that compensation base." Id.
125 Seo WTO Agreement art. VIII, supra note 120. "The MTO (also known as the WTO) shall
have legal personality, and shall be accorded by each of its Members such legal capacity as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions." Id. This provision provides adequate notice that
members must recognize the MTO as a legal authority and comply with its rules and decisions.
126 See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 24, at 4 (stressing the importance of interpreting
TRIPS in a manner that promotes access to medicines and protects the public health). When a
compulsory license is issued to a generic manufacturer it will result in lower prices to the public of
the country in which the compulsory license is granted, either because the generic is cheaper or the
brand name manufacturer lowered its prices in the face of the compulsory license.
127 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). This is factor number three in the list of factors relevant to a determination of a
reasonable royalty.
128 See id. This is factor number fifteen. It states that the amount is that which a prudent
licensee would be willing to pay as a royalty. Id. In the present circumstances of compulsory
licensing under TRIPS, a reasonable licensee would negotiate for a lower than normal royalty
because the expected profits will be lower than if sold to a developed country.
129 StandardManufacturing,42 Fed. Cl. at 764. The court stated that it has the discretion to
consider additional factors and should not feel constrained by the Georgia-Pacificfactors. Id.
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profits, which will increase the incentive to create and provide better access to those
drugs. It will also allow manufacturers to sell those drugs at affordable prices to
citizens of developing countries. 30 The benefits of increasing access to drugs far
outweighs any harm that may be done to the patent holder by its not being able to
exploit a particular area of the world where it previously had no significant market.
In fact, not allowing a patent holder to receive full compensation will increase the
likelihood that pharmaceutical companies will reduce prices"'3 in order to salvage any
profit they can in the markets of developing countries.
While the rate that the WTO should establish should not equal that which
willing parties would reach in the ordinary commercial setting, it should not be so
minimal as to extinguish all rights the patent holder has. A brief review of the rates
of other countries and a suggested rate from a U.S.-based pharmaceutical trade
company shows that a reasonable royalty rate would be in the range of 3-5%.32 This
figure does not depart greatly from the decisions of the U.S. courts in cases decided
under § 1498.133 This would provide the generic drug companies with the ability to
retain a sufficient amount of their profits, so as to permit them to sell the drugs at
low prices. This would also encourage large pharmaceutical companies to participate
in the markets of developing countries by lowering their prices.
It is very important that the WTO establish a set royalty rate that is followed for
all drugs. In establishing a set rate, the WTO should consider factors that courts in
the United States consider relevant in establishing a reasonable royalty for
governmental compulsory licensing. This provides Members with certainty and
avoids costly litigation and delays that could hinder the objectives of protecting the
public health and promoting access to life saving medicines.

1:30If an exporting Member were not allowed to keep a significant amount of its profit, this
would greatly reduce any incentive to implement a compulsory license. This would be in direct
conflict with the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement because it would reduce the probability that least
developed countries would have access to affordable medicines.
131 See South Africa: Drug Firms Drop Patent Suit, supra note 33; Donnelly, supra note 41.
Both discuss the fact that in the face of compulsory licenses issued by local governments,
pharmaceutical prices were significantly lowered. See generallyPress Release, Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNAIDS Applauds Clinton Foundation'sAgreement with
PharmaceuticalCompanies to Cut Prices ofAIDS Drugs (Oct. 23, 2003) (noting that an agreement
between the Clinton Foundation and four pharmaceutical companies significantly reduced the price
of HIV/AIDS treatment in the developing world, including several countries in Africa) available at
http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/Media/Press-Statementsol/Clinton PS 23Oct03_enpdf.htm.
1:32See James Love, Compulsory Licensing: Models for State PracticeIn Developing Countries,
Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accorde, Consumer Project on Technology,
at: http://www.eptech.org/ip/health/el/recommendedstatepractice.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
This Comment addresses government authorization to use a patent without permission of the owner
in light of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. Specifically, the report cited Japan using rates from two to
four percent; Germany from two to ten percent; Canada used a set rate of four percent; and the U.S.based trade group, Pharma, suggested a five percent royalty rate. Id.
1:3:3
Soo Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In this case,
the plaintiff appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Claims that held their patent infringed
and awarded a one percent royalty rate. Id. The Federal Circuit affirmed this rate, holding that the
lower court properly considered the entirety of the circumstances. Id. at 1570.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Any ambiguities regarding compulsory licensing under the new Implementation
Agreement must be resolved quickly and effectively due to what is at stake. 34 There
are millions of people dying worldwide because they do not have access to drugs that
could save their lives. Amending TRIPS to incorporate a definition of adequate
remuneration will help prevent further delays in providing access to much needed
medicines.
To this point, no country has yet declared itself an eligible importing or
exporting Member.' 35 However, it is inevitable that such a declaration will occur, and
when it does, the WTO needs to be prepared to deal with the repercussions of the
Implementation Agreement. Expeditiously amending TRIPS and unambiguously
setting forth all the requirements necessary to implement and utilize a compulsory
license will best deal with this potential problem. By doing so, it will speed up the
process to increase access to life-saving medicines.
While passing such an
amendment with WTO Member countries will be difficult 3 6, any uncertainties that
remain after the amendment may make it even more difficult for individual
Members' legislatures to ratify it in their respective countries.
Even though an amendment to TRIPS will assist in increasing access to
essential medicines, other problems still exist in least developed countries that
impede access to necessary drugs and treatment. Many countries lack the necessary
infrastructure to route the drugs and to assure that they are administered
properly.137
However, the Implementation Agreement, as well as the active involvement of
WTO Members, shows a willingness and desire to increase access to essential lifesaving medicines in least developed countries. These factors provide some hope for
the future resolution to the appalling health crises in least developed countries.

134 See UNICEF, Press Release, Orphan's Crisis: Worst is Yet to Come, Nov. 26, 2003,
available at http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/cosponsors/UNICEF/UNICEF PR OrphanReport_
26Nov03 en htm.htm. The release states that AIDS has already orphaned over 11 million children
in Africa, half of whom are between the ages of ten and fourteen. Id. It also notes that this is an
enormous problem with significant economic, as well as moral, implications. Id.
1:35See World Trade Organization, Dedicated Webpage for Notifications Under 30 August 2003
Decision (November 25, 2003) at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/trips-e/publiehealth-e.htm.
Following the provisions of the Implementation Agreement, the WTO has created a website
dedicated to Members who wish to take advantage of the system set out in that agreement.
Members must post their intentions to issue a compulsory license a particular product, whether to
import or export such a product. -d. To this date, no Member has posted such a notice.
136 See WTO Agreement art. X, supranote 120.
137 So Daniel Pruzin, Developing Countries Preparod to Use Now WTO Accord to Import
Cheap Modicinos, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY (Sept. 3, 2003). Quoting assistant U.S.
trade representative for services, investment, and intellectual property, James Mendenhall, the
article states that the new agreement will not solve the problem of disease. -d. Mendenhall says
that the new agreement "does not, in and of itself, ensure the production needs of medicines in these
developing countries", and that the "more fundamental problem is the lack of effective
pharmaceutical delivery systems in many developing nations." Id.

